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TONE DEAF TO THE PAST: 
MORE QUALMS ABOUT 
PUBLIC MEANING ORIGINALISM 
Jack Rakove* 
 
With some apologies for a vast degree of oversimplification, let us 
stipulate that there are two main forms of originalism.  One is known as 
“semantic” or “public meaning” originalism.  Its leading advocates include 
Lawrence Solum, Keith Whittington, and Randy Barnett (professional 
friends, all).  The leading premise of semantic originalism is that the 
meaning of the constitutional text—or, more specifically, of its individual 
clauses—was fixed at the moment of its adoption.  Under this view, the goal 
of constitutional interpretation is to recover that original meaning, and the 
best way to do that pivots on reconstructing how an informed reader, 
whether a citizen or a judge—and using the best linguistic resources 
available—would have understood the language in question.  This approach 
does not assume that the Constitution’s entire content was fixed at the point 
of adoption.  Ample room is left for the subsequent construction of 
additional meanings, in places where the Constitution is silent or 
ambiguous; originalists can differ—and differ substantially—over where to 
draw the boundaries between the realms of fixation and construction.1  In 
this approach, evidence of the political intentions and purposes of the 
adopters of the text—whether Framers or ratifiers—appears to have 
relatively little if any bearing on the Constitution’s meaning.  The 
statements they made in debate matter not as evidence of political intention, 
but rather as additional linguistic clues to the semantic meaning of disputed 
terms. 
The second form of originalism involves an approach that academic 
historians naturally favor.  For want of a better term, let us simply describe 
this as “historically grounded” originalism.  This approach assumes that the 
original meaning (or potential meanings) of specific clauses was the 
product of a set of political debates, in which both the expressed intentions 
of the Constitution’s Framers and the understandings of its ratifiers would 
prove relevant to ascertaining what the document originally meant.  This 
approach is less confident of, and less devoted to, the possibility of affixing 
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 1. Thus Jack Balkin, an originalist on the Left, is short on fixation and long on 
construction. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
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one meaning to a disputed text.  It is perfectly comfortable with treating the 
adoption of the Constitution as the result of debates that did not end in a 
linguistic consensus on the definition and meaning of key terms.  Moreover, 
the idea that a given meaning was fixed at a finite moment of historical time 
seems equally problematic—a useful legal fiction perhaps, but a wholly 
unrealistic way to imagine how constitutional texts (or any other texts) 
actually operate or perform.  That conception becomes even more doubtful 
when one considers the highly dynamic nature of political thinking during 
the Revolutionary era. 
It is no secret that historically grounded approaches to the project of 
discovering or recovering the original meaning of the Constitution appear 
out of fashion.  The number of historians who are actively concerned with 
originalism is quite small; the four scholars contributing to this forum are 
probably the best-known examples.2  Most historians consider originalism a 
game for lawyers and a playing field for that much-lampooned 
phenomenon:  law office history.  That dismissive attitude on the part of 
academic historians regrettably mistakes the significance of this realm of 
inquiry.  Historians should feel a civic, as well as an academic, commitment 
to deal with legitimate questions about the origins of the Constitution, even 
when those questions arise from a different (though still cognate) field.  It is 
also important to recognize that the divergence between the semantic and 
historical approaches identifies a crucial fault line in our very conception of 
American constitutionalism.  Semantic originalism, as a lawyer’s game, is 
inevitably devoted to constitutional jurisprudence as performed by the 
Supreme Court and, in particular, to the versions of originalism championed 
by Justices Scalia and Thomas.  By contrast, a historical approach to the 
original meaning of the Constitution, though hardly oblivious to judicial 
uses and abuses of the past, conceives of American constitutionalism as 
retaining fundamentally political elements.  It does not regard the 
Constitution solely as a document framed primarily for later judicial 
interpretation, important as that may be.  The political stories that explain 
how the Constitution was framed, interpreted, and amended—in other 
words, how it developed—would remain essential to a historically 
grounded approach to its meaning, both original and derivative. 
The historical perspective helps to explain the origins and evolution of 
my own interest in originalism, which dates to the early 1970s.  That 
interest was driven not by questions of judicial interpretation, and especially 
not those emanating from the intellectual controversy over Brown v. Board 
of Education,3 but from the intense political debates of that period, 
particularly the enactment of the War Powers Act4 and the wonderfully 
entrancing Watergate affair that ended in the near-impeachment and 
resignation of Richard Milhous Nixon.  Both of those momentous issues 
 
 2. Nevertheless, it is nice to note that Saul Cornell, Jonathan Gienapp, Helen Irving, 
and I do represent different scholarly generations. 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012). 
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involved questions about the original meaning of the Constitution, but in 
contexts where judicial involvement would be secondary or nonexistent.5 
Two factors determined my approach to recovering the original meaning 
(or “meanings”) of the Constitution.  One was the excitement of working on 
the history of the American Revolution during the intellectually vibrant era 
that began with the publication of Bernard Bailyn’s Ideological Origins of 
the American Revolution6 shortly before I started graduate study in 1969, 
which was the same year Gordon Wood’s amazing doctoral dissertation 
was published as The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787.7  It 
has long been customary for readers—both historians and scholars in other 
fields—to link these two works to the advent of republicanism as a 
dominant concept in the interpretation of the origins of American political 
ideas.  But for someone learning the trade of doing history, the works were 
equally exciting for the way in which they conveyed and depicted the nature 
of historical change itself.  Bailyn illustrated this motif nicely in opening his 
chapter on the “transformation” of colonial constitutional ideas in the 
decade before Independence: 
Words and concepts had been reshaped in the colonists’ minds in the 
course of a decade of pounding controversy—strangely reshaped, turned 
in unfamiliar directions, toward conclusions they could not themselves 
clearly perceive.  They found a new world of political thought as they 
struggled to work out the implications of their beliefs in the years before 
Independence.  It was a world not easily possessed; often they withdrew 
in some confusion to more familiar ground.8 
The authors of the first state constitutions of the mid-1770s and the 
adopters of the federal Constitution of 1787 pursued that quest, Bailyn 
observed.9  The complexity of their pursuit formed the subject of Wood’s 
great book, which traced in intricate detail the complex ways in which the 
core concepts of American constitutional thinking evolved between 1776 
and 1787.10  Yet what makes these works intellectually exciting to the 
sentient historian is not only their substantive account of what Americans 
were thinking and doing, but also their conception and portrayal of the 
process of historical change itself.  Describing change over time defines the 
narrative challenge that historians routinely face; not everyone is equally 
adept in this exercise.  These two works offered remarkable explanations 
for the dynamic character of political thinking in a revolutionary context. 
 
 5. Of course, one needs to take account of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), 
which made the impeachment proceedings (even more) inevitable.  Part of my interest also 
developed from my membership in The Reservists Committee to Stop the War and its suit to 
require members of Congress to resign either their military commissions in the reserves or 
their seats on Capitol Hill. Cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 
208 (1974).  Those were heady times, and I actually remember them. 
 6. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(enlarged ed. 1992). 
 7. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969). 
 8. See BAILYN, supra note 6, at 161. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See WOOD, supra note 7, at 273–82. 
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The second factor that shaped my approach was the assumption (or 
rather, the conviction) that any satisfactory answer to the problem of what 
the Constitution originally meant would necessarily have to be historical in 
nature.  What other choice could there possibly be?  To ask what a political 
document originally meant had to involve asking questions about the 
intentions of its authors (here let’s call them the Framers of the 
Constitution) and the understanding of its ratifiers (here identified either as 
members of the American public or as delegates to the state ratification 
conventions whose unequivocal approval of the Constitution made it the 
supreme law of the land).  Clearly distinguishing the meaning of a text from 
the intentions of its authors and the understanding of its ratifiers seemed to 
be an essential, though not sufficient, methodological rule that one had to 
apply to talk intelligently about what the Constitution originally meant, 
particularly when other commentators on this subject appeared to use these 
three terms (“meaning,” “intention,” “understanding”) loosely or 
interchangeably. 
Still, these definitions marked only a preliminary step in establishing a 
historically sound approach to the problem of doing originalism.  The 
greater challenge was the one that historians always face in resolving some 
“anomaly”—some alteration occurring in the flow of time—about the past:  
to identify and then to weigh the evidentiary value of the primary sources 
that one can bring to bear to solve some problem about historical action.  As 
I began working seriously on originalism in the early 1980s, shortly after 
my Stanford Law School colleague Paul Brest apparently invented that term 
in a seminal article,11 my goal was to develop an analytical method or 
model for dealing with these sources.  Four categories of evidence seemed 
relevant to the task.  Two I regarded as being textual in nature:  the relevant 
evidence bearing directly on the framing of the Constitution, primarily 
including the records of debates and related documents that are directly 
indicative of what the Framers were thinking12 and the wide array of 
sources documenting the ratification debates that occurred once the 
Constitution was published on September 19, 1787.13  Two other sets of 
sources I considered contextual in nature:  first, the relevant intellectual 
background that Americans inherited; and second, the inferences that could 
be drawn from their own political activities and involvements, particularly 
in the decade between declaring independence and preparing for the debates 
of 1787.  (The former of these I sometimes allude to, rather loosely, as “the 
zeitgeist”; the second could be called “lessons of experience.”14) 
 
 11. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 204 n.1 (1980) (“I use the term ‘originalism’ to describe the interpretation of text 
and original history as distinguished, for example, from the interpretation of precedents and 
social values.”). 
 12. See, e.g., THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1937). 
 13. See e.g., THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(John Kaminski et al. eds., 2012). 
 14. For further discussion, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND 
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–22 (1996). 
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Within these two subcategories of sources, a working historian might 
prefer to favor the intentions of the Framers, the actual authors of the 
document, over the understandings of the ratifiers, who were merely its 
readers.  That preference, however, would rub against the normative 
concern laid down by James Madison in 1796, which held that the ratifiers’ 
understandings were legally authoritative in a way that the mere proposals 
of the Framers were not.15 
The contextual realm poses a different problem.  Intellectual historians 
would incline to give greater weight to the authority of eminent writers—
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Bolingbroke, Montesquieu, Hume, and 
Blackstone—as well as the less-celebrated names who also influenced 
American readers, such as Henry Parker, John Trenchard and Thomas 
Gordon, Jean-Louis de Lolme, and James Burgh.  Political historians might 
instead conclude that lessons of experience outweighed the influence of 
great writers.  The Framers of the Constitution, after all, were part of the 
same revolutionary generation who rejected imperial authority, waged a war 
of national liberation, and then struggled to cope with its consequences.  
How they thought about constitutional issues must surely have been a 
significant part of that experience, at least as important as their reading.  
But giving too much weight to any of these preferences would distort the 
historian’s method rather than advance it.  One wants to take all form of 
evidence seriously and then find ways to assay the evidence’s relative value 
in specific situations. 
From these general comments, one can easily infer why a historian’s 
approach to the Founding era would diverge from the methods of semantic 
originalists.  First, and arguably most important, the dominant emphasis in 
historical writings on the creativity of revolutionary political thinking 
hardly accords with the reigning presumptions of semantic originalism.  As 
Bailyn, Wood, and others have demonstrated, the quarter century from the 
Stamp Act controversy of 1765–1766 to the framing and ratification of the 
Bill of Rights in 1789–1791 was a remarkably fruitful and creative epoch in 
the history of political thinking and constitutional innovation.16  The idea 
that core concepts would remain linguistically stable in this period, or that 
definitions inherited from British practice and usage would prove equally 
applicable in America, thus becomes highly problematic.  The task of the 
historian is to trace how these definitions and conceptions changed.  Part of 
that endeavor certainly includes examining the ways in which the 
deliberations of the late 1780s constituted a radical rethinking of the 
assumptions and beliefs of 1776.  That was the enormously complex and 
subtle achievement of Wood’s first great book.  But the work also involved 
examining how the breadth of the changes that the Federalists proposed 
 
 15. See JAMES MADISON:  WRITINGS 568–80 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999); see also RAKOVE, 
supra note 14, at 361–65 (discussing Madison’s April 6, 1796, speech).  Jonathan Gienapp’s 
work will vastly expand our grasp of the evolution of these originalist ideas in the course of 
numerous congressional debates from 1789–1796. See Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and 
Holism:  Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 (2015). 
 16. See generally BAILYN, supra note 6; WOOD, supra note 7. 
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“left” their Anti-Federalist opponents, in Wood’s brilliant phrasing, 
“holding remnants of thought that had lost their significance.”17 
This perception of the underlying character of Revolutionary-era 
constitutionalism hardly fits well with the dominant motif of semantic 
originalism, the so-called “fixation” principle, which holds that the 
linguistic content of a constitutional provision is set at the moment of its 
adoption, in terms whose meaning are already transparent to contemporary 
users.  As a legal principle, fixation seems like a wholly plausible theory:  a 
document is drafted, its authors and signers have objectives—intentions—
they seek to secure, and they do their best to impart those intentions into the 
text.  Once its content is fixed in this way, later interpreters have a legal 
obligation to ascertain and apply those intentions.  Or so semantic 
originalists like to think. 
Yet a document emerging from the kind of deliberative and polemical 
process that led to the adoption of the Constitution has distinctive (and 
perhaps unique) qualities that other forms of communication might not 
possess.  Drafting a constitution is not the same as having a conversation in 
which each participant works hard to clarify his or her meaning.  A 
constitution can be compared to a contract or compact, but who were the 
contracting parties—who were the true adopters?  Were they the Framers 
whose intentions shaped its language, or the ratifiers whose assent was 
required for its approval?  Yet when the ratifiers acted, they were not 
deciding the meaning of individual clauses, but voting on the Constitution 
in toto, through a single vote on the entire text.  Who could authoritatively 
resolve the ambiguities in the text that became evident as the contents of the 
Constitution were debated in public?  Surely not the Framers acting 
collectively.  After all, the Federal Convention was a onetime meeting that 
would never reassemble—notwithstanding the persisting qualms of 
Edmund Randolph, the nonsigning delegate who originally presented the 
Virginia Plan on May 28, 1787, and who continued to believe that a second 
general convention should indeed assemble to discuss the amendments 
proposed by the state ratification conventions.18 
Of course, it is the very difficulty of using the records of debate to derive 
wholly persuasive originalist explanations of the most controvertible 
clauses of the Constitution that has driven avowed originalists to take the 
linguistic turn.  The comfort that historians will take in sorting out a debate 
will often fall short of the level of certainty that avowed originalists would 
desire.  Historical originalists can be perfectly content in identifying the 
rival assumptions, concerns, and (yes) definitions of key words that explain 
variances in opinion among the adopters, proponents, and critics of the 
 
 17. See WOOD, supra note 7, at 524. 
 18. This creates a contrast with the Massachusetts Convention of 1779–1780, which did 
reassemble after blustery winter storms to survey the returns of the towns to the constitution 
that John Adams had largely drafted during his brief return home in 1779.  The records of 
those deliberations are available in the exemplary THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY:  DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780 (Oscar Handlin & 
Mary Flug Handlin eds., 1966). 
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Constitution.  Yet they also remain free to conclude that some explanations 
of the original meaning of a clause make better sense than others.  Here, for 
example, one can have lots of fun19 reviewing the majority and minority 
opinions in District of Columbia v. Heller,20 by far the most originalist 
decision of them all, and contrasting the different ways in which Justices 
Scalia and Stevens deal with the evidence of the past.  Some interpretations 
of the original meaning of particular clauses will prove more plausible or 
persuasive than others; there is good reason to give greater interpretive 
authority to, say, The Federalist than to any of a number of other 
publications that appeared in 1787–1788.  Historians who do originalism 
have an obligation to explain why they believe some sources have greater 
probative value than others.  Yet neither can they escape the fundamentally 
political character of the debate they are analyzing. 
Rather than rely as much as they do on the linguistic theory of Paul 
Grice, one wonders why semantic originalists do not pay more attention to 
the linguistic ideas that were dominant in eighteenth-century America.21  
There is no better account of the linguistic difficulties that Americans 
would have to face in thinking constitutionally than James Madison’s 
brilliant epistemological reflection on the nature of political reasoning in 
Federalist 37.22  Embedded in this analysis is a crisp distillation of John 
Locke’s discussion of language in Book III of An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding.23  “Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of 
objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties,” Madison observed, 
the medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each 
other adds a fresh embarrassment.  The use of words is to express ideas.  
Perspicuity, therefore, requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly 
formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and 
exclusively appropriate to them.  But no language is so copious as to 
supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to 
include many equivocally denoting different ideas.  Hence it must happen 
that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and 
 
 19. Unless one also happens to think that American opinions about the Second 
Amendment correlate causally with (1) our high homicide rate, (2) suicides that might have 
been avoided because guns provide the most effective means of self-annihilation, and (3) the 
greater likelihood that a firearm kept handy for self-defense within the home will end with 
the accidental injury or death of an innocent party rather than justice rendered on a criminal 
intruder.  I am disappointed that the periodic group murders that regularly punctuate our 
headlines are not greeted with public statements confirming that these casualties, regrettable 
as they are, are simply the price we need to pay for that “palladium of liberty” (to cite an 
eighteenth-century phrase) and the Second Amendment as explained by Justice Scalia in the 
most prominent application of semantic originalism, the majority opinion in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 20. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 21. For an explanation of these linguistic ideas, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism 
and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 455 n.3 (2013); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 480 
(2013); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, 96 (2010). 
 22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison). 
 23. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. III (Peter H. 
Nidditch ed., Clarendon ed. 1975) (1689). 
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however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition 
of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in 
which it is delivered.  And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or 
less, according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined.  
When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own 
language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and 
doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.24 
Locke’s assault on the stability of linguistic meaning, or on ideas of 
linguistic fixity, was radical, as we know from the brilliant work of the 
English historian Hannah Dawson.25  And unlike the work of Grice, which 
was not framed with political discussions in mind, Locke was deeply 
mindful of the insidious effects that semantic instability could have on 
matters of public concern, including law and religion.26 
Locke’s critique of language in turn inspired an eighteenth-century 
reaction that attempted to provide language with a degree of fixity and 
stability it seemed to lack.  The period was a great era in the history of the 
dictionary, and Samuel Johnson, that great man of letters, was hardly alone 
in pursuing that quest.27  But in the realm of politics and constitutionalism 
more generally, events continued to prove disruptive of linguistic stability.  
Critical terms, like constitution or executive power, or establishment of 
religion or sovereignty, came under sustained pressure, not least because of 
the inventiveness of American revolutionary politics.  Anyone who thinks 
he can establish conditions of linguistic fixation without taking that 
turbulent set of events into account is pursuing a fool’s errand.28 
 
 24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 22 (James Madison). 
 25. See infra note 26. 
 26. See HANNAH DAWSON, LOCKE, LANGUAGE, AND EARLY-MODERN PHILOSOPHY 129–
53 (2007) (discussing “semantic instability”); Hannah Dawson, Locke on Language in 
(Civil) Society, 26 HIST. OF POL. THOUGHT 397, 399 (2005). 
 27. See, e.g., JOHN HOWE, LANGUAGE AND POLITICAL MEANING IN REVOLUTIONARY 
AMERICA 20–23 (2004). 
 28. In my immodest view, much more work needs to be done on the entire concept of 
political language as such.  Dawson’s work, see sources cited supra note 26, is helpful in this 
account; so is PHILIP PETTIT, MADE WITH WORDS:  HOBBES ON LANGUAGE, MIND, AND 
POLITICS (2008).  On the American side, John Howe, see supra note 27, is very helpful, not 
least in discussing the eighteenth-century response to Locke’s assault. 
